

TAB *A*

TAB A

Departmental Policy Obstacles to Effective

Cooperation with CIA

I. The National Security Council Intelligence Directives.

1. The most spectacular evidence of the lack of departmental cooperation with CIA is represented by the NSCID'S. These are cited as such evidence on the grounds that:

a. as a result of the coordination of these directives with the IAC agencies prior to NSC action they represent only those concessions to CIA that the IAC agencies were willing to make, and consequently do not provide the Director of Central Intelligence with the authority required by him to discharge the responsibilities imposed upon him.

b. by IAC insistence they contain all manner of escape clauses which vitiate Departmental responsibilities to CIA, and thereby hamper the objectives of the National Security Act of 1947 toward a fully coordinated US intelligence effort.

2. The IAC agencies, under these directives tend to utilize the Intelligence Advisory Committee as an executive rather than an advisory body to the extent that they impose upon the normal relations of the D/CI with the NSC, which he serves.

3. NSCID'S #1, 2, and 3, of particular concern to ORE, are cited as cases in point with respect to the foregoing.

II. Departmental Intelligence Policies.

1. There is a tendency for departmental policy, rather than objective analysis, to be the determining factor in IAC dissents to CIA Intelligence Estimates. This also is a strong limitation on the support that CIA can expect from the Departments in the formulation of estimates. The interests of the national security cannot be served in any sense by intelligence that has been altered to conform to existing policy. On the contrary it is a function of intelligence to challenge the assumptions upon which policy has been based whenever the facts support such action. The influence of policy-making echelons is particularly notable in the case of the Department of State, which has established procedures providing for the clearance of intelligence reports with the policy desks before submission to CIA. The description of this system is quoted in Case #1 (under TAB A). For examples of the effect of this policy control over departmental intelligence, see TAB C, particularly cases 11 through 15.

- 2 -

2. OCD has previously presented evidence to the DCI concerning policies of the Intelligence Division of the Army that obstructed the support rendered by that agency to CIA. This situation is of such importance to ORE that concurrence and support to the OCD position by this Office should be made a matter of record. The OCD evidence is presented as Case #2 (under TAB A).

3. Liaison Policies: The liaison policy of the Department of the Army, included in the referenced Case #2, TAB A, is similar to liaison policies of the other departments. The net effect of such policies is a restriction upon CIA in access to individuals outside the intelligence agencies of the Departments, and to so-called "operational data" not normally available to the departmental intelligence agencies, but of great value for intelligence purposes.

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30 September 1949

CASE #1

The following is an excerpt from the report of the Steering Committee of the Department of State Reorganization Task Force #2 guiding the new organization of the State Department Intelligence Operation.

"(b) Submission of Intelligence Estimates to the Top Command

As part of its recommendation for the reorganization and reorientation of the intelligence effort, the Hoover Commission Report stated that the intelligence unit "should be a device by which the Secretary and Under Secretary can obtain expert evaluations and check on information coming from the action units." The Steering Committee has given a great deal of attention to this problem. It has concluded that R should supply intelligence estimates to the Secretary, Under Secretary and Policy Planning Staff without review by other offices when so requested. In such cases interested offices would be provided with copies of such documents for post-audit. In all other cases, intelligence papers produced in R for the top command should be reviewed by the appropriate regional or Functional Office prior to submission. In the event of disagreement, the reviewing area should be given an opportunity to append its dissent. The Steering Committee believes that this procedure protects the ability of the research and intelligence organization to produce independent estimates. At the same time a sound relationship between the research-intelligence organization and other parts of the Department can be maintained."

"(c) Dissemination Outside the Department of Intelligence Reports and Estimates

The Steering Committee has, after thorough consideration, concluded that in order that the Department may speak at all times with a consistent voice in its relationships with other agencies, the research and intelligence reports and estimates must be reviewed by the appropriate action office before they are distributed to other agencies. The Committee believes that the review procedure it has recommended gives R the opportunity to express its independent judgement in such reports and estimates, and does not preclude the Department from fulfilling its responsibilities to the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. (There follows a dissent by Mr. Howe to this conclusion.)"

"Dissent by Mr. Howe

Mr. Howe dissents from the conclusion and recommendation requiring review of all estimates going outside the Department. According to this procedure the research-intelligence organization would find itself in a dilemma wherein, as the Steering Committee indicates, it must join with the rest of the Department in speaking with a consistent voice outside

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the Department and yet, by directive of the National Security Council in establishing coordination for the intelligence agencies, it is obligated to produce estimates based on intelligence factors which therefore might not be consistent with existing policy, including departmental policy. These coordinated national estimates are for the use of the several Departments and for the National Security Council. Mr. Howe believes that R would prefer and expect its contributions generally to reflect the views of and the information available in, the action offices, and it would endeavor, as it has in the past, to achieve this end. Nevertheless, he believes this should not be made mandatory because the other intelligence agencies, finding the Department's intelligence organization estopped from submitting estimates independent of existing policy considerations, would tend to replace the Department's contribution by their own, thus destroying the foundation for coordinated national estimates. Such a situation would not be in the best interests of the Department and further would tend to encourage the development of competitive intelligence production concerned with foreign policy with which the Department would have to deal."

"Mr. Howe recommends therefore that R be responsible for obtaining the advice of the appropriate action office before dissemination outside the Department. "

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TAB A

CASE # 2

Reference is made to the memorandum to the DCI from the AD/OCD dated 9 March 1949, subject: Coordination with Intelligence Division, GSUSA.

This memorandum documents at length obstructive attitudes prevailing among working-level personnel in the Intelligence Division. ORE takes this opportunity to underline the OCD findings in this case.

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TAB

B

TAB B

Departmental Action Failure in Support of CIA

I. Failure to Fulfill CIA Requirements for Intelligence Information

1. In general, ORE has always experienced difficulty in obtaining prompt, and adequate IAC collection action on requirements for intelligence information. The problems that CIA faces regarding requirements to the IAC agencies vary in each agency in nature, subject, and complexity, but all seem to stem from an unwillingness on the part of the agencies to recognize CIA's intelligence mission and its concurrent need for foreign intelligence information. Furthermore, CIA has no workable legal means by which it may press or enforce its requests upon the IAC agencies, know if its requests are being acted upon, or in what priority they are considered. In most cases, when the IAC agencies do transmit CIA requirements to the field for action, the prior delay in departmental offices (especially in the Department of State) makes the requests outdated even before they reach the field.

a. Although this tendency to protect position and prestige for the Department is a natural and important factor and should perhaps not be construed as lack of cooperation, it is nevertheless true that CIA, relying as it must upon the Department of State for the great bulk of its intelligence information, finds itself helplessly blocked by such restrictive objections to its legitimate and necessary requests for fresh and timely information from the field.

b. Even if the Foreign Service could be persuaded or reorganized to the point where it might be relied upon to be responsive to requests for intelligence information, there would still be the problem of setting the gears in motion. Presumably because of the many Foreign Service protests registered in the past, State has devised an elaborate system of clearances which must first be gone through before a CIA request for field collection may be flashed to a foreign post. This involves clearance through both the research and the political desks, as well as any other interested components of the department. As a result, anyone in either ARA or DRA or MD, may, for example, effectually veto an ORE request for information on arms traffic in Latin America. Under these circumstances, an extremely urgent request with top priority may, under favorable circumstances press through IAD for action in a week, as for instance, our Requirement Directive 6066, which was of interest to the topmost policy levels. Under less favorable circumstances, and in the absence of a single key man in OIR, the request might be indefinitely delayed. A common practice in State when such a report comes through is to reply that OIR feels the information in the files adequately covers

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the situation, even though the CIA desk is fully aware of that same information and has clearly indicated that field action is needed. This spins out into a long-distance altercation between the desks of CIA and OIR which may usually be relied on to delay the request well beyond the point where the information may be of use. The situation verges on the ridiculous occasionally, when the CIA desk discovers discrepancies in the Foreign Service reporting and requests clarification from the field. OIR replies that the discrepancy has been noted, but that it cannot imagine how to reconcile the reported data without going to the field, precisely what CIA asked in the first place. In the meantime, several weeks have passed. This was the case in RD 6129 on Yugoslav crude oil production.

c. ORE has had indications in the past that there is a lack of coordination in State between IAD (Intelligence and Acquisition) and the Foreign Service that sometimes hampers the processing of requirements. In one case, ORE was refused a requirement by IAD for a field study on a foreign political situation on the grounds that the foreign service personnel at the post were inexperienced. Strangely enough, ORE's requirement was based upon a similar study accomplished on the same subject and in the same country. The only difference being that a different portion of the country was involved. (See case #9, under TAB B)

2. ORE's problems in negotiating requirements with the Defense Agencies all centered mainly with the Department of the Army and within this agency mainly on the withholding of information. Probably the greatest problem stems from the old fiction of information received by Army being "operational" in character and thus not of valid interest to CIA. Of course this determination is made in every case by the Army with CIA unable to review the material. For months ORE has received little or no information from SCAP, even when conditions in the Far East were at the most critical period in modern history. On the Western Europe area, ORE has received very spotty information on the Western Zone of Germany, while reporting from zones where US collecting organizations were in considerably more difficult circumstances were considered adequate.

3. Review of past requests by ORE upon IAC collection facilities reveals quite clearly that the IAC agencies cooperate with CIA in collection matters only insofar as the requested action happens to coincide with their own primary interests and responsibilities for intelligence production. Within the area of overlapping interests between this Agency and the IAC, fairly good results may be achieved. Outside such overlap, little can be accomplished. An aggravated case of this persistent difficulty is presented by the request made by ORE upon Army for verification and amplification of data on Soviet and Satellite manufacturing facilities, which had ultimately to be abandoned because of the low priority assigned by Army to such information as compared with higher priority topics, such as identification and description of ordnance.

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- 3 -

4. Typical examples of departmental failure to collect the information needed by CIA are cited in Cases #1 through 6 (under TAB B).

5. An analysis of requests for information sent to the Department of State during a sample six month period in 1948 and 1949 indicates that twenty-five percent were not even transmitted to the field for action and that the remainder were held in the department an average of twenty-five days before being forwarded to the field for collection. Only about one-fourth of CIA's requests to the Department of State received an adequate response. These statistics are presented as Case #7 (under TAB B).

6. In many instances the Department of State finds it "unnecessary" or purposeless to comply with CIA requests for field action. Cases #8 through #11 are examples of this censorship of CIA requirements.

II. Failure to Make Available, to CIA, Information of Value for Intelligence Purposes

1. CIA receives regularly the bulk of the regular flow of information to the Departments from the field. There are certain exceptions, however, that generally involve the most important subjects or areas. A large number of important messages from the field are treated as "eyes only" messages and are not sent to CIA regardless of their intelligence value. Messages from Germany, Japan, and Korea have in general been withheld on the basis, yet no accurate estimate of the situation in any of these areas can be made without access to this traffic. Another frequent practice is for an IAC agency to treat a new and important subject, such as the North Atlantic Pact, as a special security problem and to handle messages pertaining to the subject out of channels. This makes it difficult for CIA to learn of the existence of the messages in the first place and leaves a big gap in our files if the restriction is eventually overcome. Intentional or not, this is a most effective way of limiting the accuracy and effectiveness of CIA estimates.

2. One attitude frequently encountered among IAC officials is that information will be furnished to CIA on specific request, but that knowledge of the existence of the information will be closely guarded, making it difficult for CIA to make the request. Cases 12, 13, and 16 (under TAB B) furnish evidence of this attitude.

III. Failure to Provide Departmental Intelligence to CIA

1. The preparation of national intelligence estimates, purporting to utilize Departmental intelligence is an impossible task unless the Estimator has a thorough knowledge of the thinking of the various departments on both short and long-range situations and complete access to the departmental intelligence products. While ORE is not in as good a position to document this point as it OCD, nearly every component of ORE has discovered through opposite number contact that the other agencies are producing material that never comes to CIA.

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- 4 -

2. In many cases, the most important work done by the IAC agencies is in answer to special requests from within their own departments or by other departments. This type of study is rarely sent to CIA. In fact, CIA is rarely informed of the existence of specific studies, but knows of the situation largely as a result of statements from IAC personnel and from personal observation of CIA personnel on temporary duty with or visiting the IAC agencies. A typical statement from a key member of ORE is quoted in illustration in Case #16 (under TAB B).

3. Most attempts by CIA to comply with the NSCID provision that CIA should use Departmental Intelligence in National Intelligence Estimates have been negotiated informally with opposite numbers in the various departments. Experience has proved that the Departments do not readily cooperate in matters of concern to CIA. Examples of CIA efforts are given in Cases #14 and #15 (under TAB B).

IV. Failure to Advise CIA on Intelligence Research and Production, Projected, in Process and Completed.

1. NSCID #3 specifically provides that each agency "exchange information on projects and plans for the production of Staff Intelligence."

2. There can be no efficient planning of production in ORE until we know what the other agencies are also doing. CIA can never do its job of coordinating the production of the IAC agencies until we are continuously informed of what they are doing. There have been many attempts, most informal but some formal, to obtain this information.

3. The following is the status of notification by the four main IAC agencies:

a. State: ORE receives the "Monthly Survey of Intelligence Research in Progress and Completed", which covers materials in process during a single calendar month. We generally receive this at least two weeks after the end of the month which it covers. Its principal inadequacy, besides this delay, is that it covers only a relatively small portion of the projects undertaken by OIR.

b. Army: Until October 1948, ORE received a listing of "Projects in the Mill" on the first of each month. Since 1 October 1948 we have received no notification of Army projects.

c. Navy: ORE receives no listing of ONI projects, either in progress or as completed.

d. Air: Until May 1948, ORE received a monthly list of "Studies Completed by the Air Intelligence Division". Since 10 May we have received no further listings from Air.

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4. In contrast to the above, CIA sends to each of these agencies a copy of the monthly ORE Status Report, which shows projects completed, projects in reproduction, projects undergoing coordination, projects under review, projects in draft form, etc. This explicit report on ORE projects should be of substantial benefit to the other agencies.

b. Case #16, TAB B, is further evidence in support of the foregoing.

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CASE #1

RD #6529 - ORE Originated, 30 May 1949

This requirement requested five topics of information on [] political parties in order that estimates concerning forthcoming elections could be made by CIA.

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ORE REQUIREMENTS DIVISION LOGS INDICATE THE
FOLLOWING SUSPENSE CHECKS

10 June : OCD requested 10 day extension of deadline - extension granted - established for 24 June

30 June : In view of an estimate produced, OCD checked to see if points 1, 2, and 5, were still requested. Answered yes

1 July : Checked about deadline with OCD. OCD remarked that Army representative stated they "had dropped the ball". A cable supposed to go out 30 June. New suspense set for 15 July

15 July : Check for status - suspense set for 29 July

26 July : Cable from [] in response to RD. OCD requests ORE comment on adequacy. New suspense 3 August

27 July : Branch remarks that only one of five points covered anywhere near adequately

8 Aug : Told OCD to see if anything exists over and above cable. New suspense 12 August

30 Aug : Elections passed - told to close out requirement

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Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000300030004-1 TAB B

CASE #2

RD #6437 - ORE Originated, 11 May 1949

25X1 On 11 May ORE originated a request (RD 6437) for the latest available totals for certain specific items in the and 1948. ORE indicated that all available sources in Washington had been exploited.

ORE REQUIREMENTS DIVISION LOGS INDICATE THE
FOLLOWING SUSPENSE CHECKS

- 3 June : State memorandum cited field reports received in Wash. that gave totals requested. Memorandum also referred requester to ORE report (The information had been requested in order to bring that particular report up to date and to eliminate discrepancies appearing in the other field reports cited by State)
- 10 June : ORE memorandum to OCD described particular discrepancies appearing in available reports and indicated the Turkish agency that has such information.
- 6 July : Partial reply from State
- 15 Aug : State airgram states report being forwarded
- 26 Aug : State despatch received giving fairly complete information
- 8 Sept : ORE originated new requirements to clarify inconsistency
- 24 Sept : Cable sent to field

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CASE #3

RD #8186 - Originated ORE, 10 December 1948:

ORE REQUIREMENTS DIVISION LOGS INDICATE THE
FOLLOWING SUSPENSE CHECKS

- 7 June: Asked State to check with field personnel - suspense established for 15 June
- 16 June: OCD asked to check with State - suspense established for 21 June
- 21 June: State checked again, follow-up drafted to field - suspense established for 28 June
- 27 June: The follow-up of 21 June still in process of going out
- 30 June: Another State check, believe that follow-up has gone out-suspense established for 15 July
- 12 July: Information received that the State follow-up has gone out - suspense established for 29 July
- 5 Aug : ORE checked to see if anything received
- 16 Aug : Another check to see if anything received - State refuses to send another follow-up to field
- 31 Aug : Check with OCD, decided in view of no action to close as failure. Closed this date.

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CASE #/1

RD #5538 - ORE Originated, 30 May 1949

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ORE REQUIREMENTS DIVISION LOGS INDICATE THE
FOLLOWING SUSPENSE CHECKS

8 July 1949 : ORE received on 8 July 1949 a State Department memorandum dated 1 July 1949, which purported to satisfy the collection directive served on State by OCD. The former had failed to take requested field action.

8-19 July : Reviewed State reply within ORE and with OCD. This review revealed that a complete list of the officials

25X1

19 July :

5 Aug : ORE checked to see if any action by State

10 Aug : ORE notified by OCD that State was sending informal memo to field

17 Aug : OCD reported, after check, that above memo actually dispatched

9 Sept. : ORE received State Department memorandum, dated 30 August 1949, which contained information on PAN identical with that in original July memo. Information deemed incomplete.

10-19 Sept : Reviewed State reply within ORE and with OCD. Memo written on 19 September '49 to OCD, citing more complete information already in ORE files, and again requesting State field action

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CASE #6

RD #6218 - ORE originated - 31 January 1949



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ORE REQUIREMENTS DIVISION LOGS INDICATE THE
FOLLOWING SUSPENSE CHECKS

- 1 March : Army answered with ID views on military items
- 10 March : State Department sent request to the field. No
reply received to date
- 26 April : SO responded with a complete but untimely report

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CASE #7

An analysis of a six month sample of requests made by CIA on the Department of State for collection action in late 1948 and early 1949 reveals the following situation:

- a. Approximately 25% of CIA requests to State are not transmitted to the field.
- b. The average delay by State in sending the remainder of the requests to the field is 25 days.
- c. 28% of CIA requests to State result in some sort of specific response from the field.
- d. In addition to "c", approximately 47% of CIA requests are sent to the field but do not affect the normal spontaneous reporting from the field.
- e. Even when a report is prepared in direct response to a CIA request it is frequently inadequate and can not be clarified or enlarged upon without going through the same time-consuming procedure.

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2 May 1949

CASE #8

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C O P Y

TO : Assistant Director, OCD
Central Intelligence Agency
FROM : Chief, Acquisition and Distribution
Division, Department of State
SUBJECT: CD 6360

After careful consideration by the cognizant Research and Political Divisions of the Department it was decided that a special instruction on this subject to the missions was unnecessary. It was felt that in view of present reporting from Montevideo on the activities of Argentine exiles, particularly with reference to the Junta for the Defense of Democracy and on the ILO Conference, it can be expected that this material will be provided in the normal course of reporting.

OLI: IAD:

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CASE #9

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1949

TO: : Assistant Director, OCD
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM : Chief, Acquisition and Distribution
Division, Department of State

SUBJECT: CD 6323.1

It is the opinion of the Division of Southwest European Affairs that the preparation of the report request in CD 6323.1 is beyond the capabilities of the present staff in [] All members of the cognizant mission are newly assigned and lack the experience and background necessary to prepare such a report.

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Under the circumstances it is felt that it would be to no purpose to send this request to the field.

/s/ Philip G. Strong

OLI:IAD []

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30 August 1949

TO : Assistant Director, OCD
Central Intelligence Agency


FROM : Chief, Acquisition and Distribution
Division, Department of State

SUBJECT: CD No. 6618.1

The Embassy at Prague has followed closely the reorganization of the Czech economic administration and its relationship with the Soviet Union and the Satellite countries, but the Department has received no information which might substantiate the CIA report with regard to the establishment in Czechoslovakia of a Western European Branch of the "Economic Office", an agency of Soviet economic warfare. The Department believes that if such an organization had in fact been established, this would have been reported by reliable sources.

It is not contemplated that field action will be taken in this case.

OLI:IAD



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CASE # 11

21 December 1949

Assistant Director, OCD, Central
Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief, Acquisition and Distribution
Division, Department of State
CD 6120.1

The Department of State regrets that it is unable to supply the information requested, but, at the same time, does not believe any purpose would be served by referring the inquiry to the field.

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The Embassy in [] is somewhat handicapped in any attempt to secure information on this subject because of reluctance to evince any official interest in the [] Members of the Department who have, however, attempted to obtain information of the kind requested, have been repeatedly unsuccessful and have come to hold the opinion that this information simply does not exist. Under the circumstances it is believed that current reporting is as nearly adequate as can be expected.

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TAB B

CASE #12

The following is from the files of the Western European branch:

25X1 "Col. Ahalt of Staff Communications in the Dept. of Army, informed [] of IC/ORE, that there were very few Telecons coming through and that CIA always receives a copy unless there is a limited distribution, in which case if CIA finds out it exists, they may request it and the Army will be only too glad to loan it to CIA."

One of the safest and most effective ways of sabotaging CIA is to delay, under one pretext or another, the fulfillment of CIA's needs. CIA cannot be expected to maintain an espionage system among the IAC agencies in order to discover the information that it needs in order to do its job.

It might be added that the Colonel's statement (that there are very few telecons) does not accord with the testimony of CIA personnel who have participated in telecons themselves or have learned about them through other channels.

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CASE # 13

EXAMPLE OF DEFICIENCY IN ROUTINE REPORTING FROM THE FIELD

On 6 May 1949, ORE requested, via RD #6419, that it desired two copies of a report prepared on [] by an official of the Maritime Service. Upon investigation by OCD it developed that the Maritime Service knew of a report prepared by SCAP, that was, in the opinion of the Maritime Service, a much more complete and thorough report than the one prepared by their official.

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It is ORE's opinion that this type of information should be included in routine dissemination to the Central Intelligence Agency. If ORE had not received knowledge of this report by chance, there could have well been considerable duplication had ORE undertaken a research project on this topic.

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CASE # 14

On 15 April 1948 CIA requested research support from the Army and the Air Force on a study of the [] forces. This was a matter within the jurisdiction of those agencies and appropriate for "farming out" to them by CIA. Both agencies replied that they felt that this request should have been made to the JIG instead. The JIG in turn indicated that its mission was to serve the Joint Chiefs and that CIA should not request the JIG for such help.

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Partial assistance was eventually received from the Army. Inasmuch as the final reply from Army was Top Secret, it will not be reproduced here. Other pertinent documents are attached.

Enclosures (4)

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CASE # 14 - Enclosure 1

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

15 April 1948

SUBJECT: Intelligence Request

ENCLOSURE: Outline for a Composite Study of the Armament and
Equipment status of the French Armed Forces

1. CIA contemplates making a composite study of the armament and equipment status of the [] The proposed scope of the study is indicated in the Enclosure hereto which is offered as a check-list that might be helpful to the departments concerned in preparing the desired material.

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2. In the preparation of this composite study, it would be most helpful if the assistance of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force could be obtained.

3. It would be appreciated if each concerned department would prepare material for the part of the outline appropriate to its field and return its findings to this office not later than Friday, 30 April 1948.

S/ THEODOR BABBITT
Assistant Director
Reports and Estimates

CASE # 14 - Enclosure 2

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DDM-12
29 April 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL JOSEPH HALVERSON, USAF
CIA Liaison Officer

Subject: Basic Material for a Composite Study of the Armament
and Equipment Status of the

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References: a. Your Memo of 27 April
b. CIA Memo of 15 April
c. Air Intelligence Div., Memo, 23 April
d. D/I Memo dated 23 April

The Joint Intelligence Group does not believe that CIA should request the JIG for the material needed by the CIA in the preparation of this study inasmuch as the JIG, as a part of the Joint Staff, is set up primarily to serve the needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate agencies, and hence, does not concur in the replies contained in references c and d.

S/ W. E. TODD, USAF
Major General, Joint Intelligence Group
The Joint Staff

cc: with copies of ref.
a, c and d to:
D/I, USAF
D/I, GSUSA
Chief of Naval Intel.

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CASE # 14 - Enclosure 3

CSGID 907

23 April 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Armed Forces Intelligence

1. Reference CIA request for intelligence on "...Armament and Equipment Status of the [redacted] from ORE, dated 15 April 1948 (attached as Incl 1).

25X1

2. The subject CIA request indicates that CIA is undertaking a study that is of dominant interest to, and totally within the purview of, the Armed Forces. In the opinion of this office, intelligence of this type should be prepared, in final form, by the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff.

1 Incl
Memo as stated
in par. 1 above w/incl

S/ CARTER W. CLARKE,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Deputy Director of Intelligence

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CASE #114 - Enclosure 4

23 April 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Attention: Mr. Theodore Babbitt, Assistant Director
Reports and Estimates

SUBJECT: Intelligence Request

1. Reference your memorandum dated 15 April 1948, requesting material to assist CIA in making a composite study of the armament and equipment status of the [redacted] this request has been received and reviewed in the Directorate of Intelligence, Hq, USAF.

25X1

2. It appears from the outline inclosed with your memorandum that the study is in the field of primary interest and responsibility of the military services. It is believed that such a study should be acted upon by the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a matter of their responsibility.

1 Incl
Cy memo frm CIA
dtd 15 Apr 48
w/Incl w/d

5/ JAMES F. OLIVE, JR.
Colonel, U.S.A.F.
Chief, Air Intelligence Division
DI/USAF Liaison Representative to
Office of Reports and Estimates, CIA

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CASE #15

The following statement was made by the Eastern Europe/USSR Branch.

"This Branch does not receive the various intelligence memoranda, projects, etc., prepared by the various IAC agencies and circulated only within the department of origin."

"A specific instance occurred recently when an analyst who had formally filed a collection requirement was advised that the desired information could be obtained from ID. The analyst called upon the Technical Section, Special Projects Group, ID. He observed reports in preparation and was informed that the study would be completed 1 September. ID stated that the report would not be available to CIA even though formally requested.

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28 September 1949

CASE # 16

The following statement was made by Mr. Ludwell Montague, Chief of the Global Survey Group, who was chief of the Central Reports Staff when the CIG was first organized, later acting assistant director for ORE, and an active participant in high-level negotiations with the IAC agencies throughout the history of CIA. This background qualifies him to speak from personal experience on the subject of IAC cooperation.

"CIA has never been fully informed regarding the research and production being carried on in any of the IAC agencies. From the outset these agencies have quite openly declared that they would give us this information regarding work undertaken on their own initiative, but would withhold information regarding work done by request or direction, on the ground that knowledge of the latter category was a matter under the control of the requesting or directing authority rather than of themselves. Inasmuch as virtually all projects nowadays fall into the latter category, we are in effect denied access to all IAC intelligence production except that reported in routine periodicals and a few low-level OIR publications. A considerable volume of other production does exist: for example, I have seen in P&O a number of ID studies unknown to ORE (but not of such a nature as to justify their being withheld)."

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TAB

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TAB C

DEPARTMENTAL FAILURES IN COORDINATION
OF CIA REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

1. Tab C contains a series of cases which illustrate the various types of problems encountered in the implementation of the coordinating process called for by DCI 3/1 and more particularly DCI 3/2. These problems arise mainly from (1) delays caused by Agency failure to comply with the terms of the directives, especially those of para. 4b of DCI 3/1, which defines their obligations in regard to dissents and concurrences; (2) actual negation of the principles underlying the coordination process, caused by failure of Agency personnel to represent the views of their agencies; (3) the introduction of agency policy as a factor in intelligence estimates, which also negates the fundamental principles of intelligence work, let alone the coordination process.

2. Case No. 1, that of ORE 17-49, "The Strategic Importance of the Far East to the US and the USSR," brings out so many of the different types of coordination difficulties that it is worth while to examine it in some detail. Work on ORE 17-49 was begun in July, 1948. The finished study was disseminated in May, 1949. Even though CIA took extraordinary measures in this case to utilize agency materials and to ensure that the agencies were consulted at each step in the preparation of the paper, two agencies ultimately dissented. The Navy's "dissent," however, could not

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possibly qualify as such under the terms of DCI 3/1, but was a complaint directed at vague and undefined deficiencies of the text, with which the Navy's representative had shown himself in general agreement up to the last two conferences. State/OIR sent in a formal concurrence but later and after the paper had actually been published, reversed its stand and entered a belated dissent. This dissent, moreover, obviously was not that of the Intelligence Organization of the Department, but stemmed from the overriding views of a policy desk which apparently insisted that the intelligence, however true, must be modified to suit policies being followed in the Department. Again, this State dissent was based, when it did come in, on matters purely military in character, even though the three military agencies had no fault to find with the paper. Enclosure A and Enclosure B to Case No. 1 are offered in amplification of the above.

3. It should be stated that this is a relatively small selection of cases, many more of which could be furnished, all pointing to the same conclusions, namely that the IAC Agencies, rather than using the coordination process for the purposes for which it was intended have frequently used it in an attempt to force their own views, even to literary preferences, upon CIA.

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CASE # 1

ORE 17-49: "The Strategic Importance of the Far East to the US and the USSR" (Published 4 May 1949)

1. The very long and intricate coordination of ORE 17-49 brings out, inter alia, the following points:

a. Even though CIA took extraordinary measures (see Enc. A) in accordance with DCI 3/1 to use agency materials and to insure that the agencies were consulted at each step in the preparation of the paper, two agencies ultimately dissented. The time and effort expended in obtaining agency contributions and agreement was, in effect, wasted.

b. Navy's dissent could not possibly qualify within the terms of DCI 3/2, para. 5. It complains (1) that ORE 17-49 "contains obscurities, apparent contradictions, and unwarranted presumptions regarding US plans and policies" (none of these being in any way identified) "to the end that the reader is required to evolve his own analysis of the situation in order to reach a sound appraisal of the strategic importance of the Far East," (an obviously difficult allegation to prove in any case, which is offered quite without proof); and (2) that the Summary is "inchoate" and inadequate--another allegation for which no proof is offered.

c. Even after its concurrence had been given and the paper had already been published, the State Department felt justified in reversing its stand and entering a belated dissent.

d. State's dissent arose, furthermore, not from any disagreement with the truth or soundness of the intelligence involved, but from the

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dictates of a policy desk which apparently insisted that the intelligence, however true, must be modified to suit policies being followed in the Department. (The following statement by the Chief B/FE, ORE is offered in support of the statement: "In the case of ORE 17-49, unqualified concurrence was given orally by Mr. Charles Stelle, Chief, DRE (OIR), Department of State. Mr. Stelle had been working continuously with B/FE on the project for several months. Mr. Stelle, unfortunately, was replaced by Mr. Huntsberger, who, at the request of Mr. Butterworth's office, recommended a substantial dissent on the basic thesis of the paper.")

e. Despite the recommendations in DCI 3/2, para. 4, State's dissent on ORE 17-49 attacked purely military estimates even though the three military intelligence agencies had found no fault with them.

2. Enc. A "B/FE Progress Report and Work Sheets on the Production of ORE 17-49"; and Enc. B "Chronology of Coordination of ORE 17-49 after the Final Coordination Meetings of 13 and 14 April" are offered in amplification of the above.

Enclosure A to Case # 1

Work Sheets on ORE 17-49

Only one copy of Enclosure A was prepared and is attached to copy # 1 of the report.

- 3 -

SECRET

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Enclosure B to Case # 1

"Chronology of Coordination of ORE 17-49 After the Final Coordination Meetings of 13 and 14 April"

18 April 49 - Revised draft forwarded for formal concurrence or dissent.

22 April 49 - Army concurred.

27 April 49 - Air Force concurred.

28 April 49 - Dissented (Navy).

29 April 49 - State concurred (later stated to have been issued inadvertently) .*

27 May 49 - State dissented.

* 17-27 May 49 - State stated OIR concurrence was inadvertent.

- 4 -

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CASE # 2

ORE 69: "Possible Consequences of Communist Control of Greece in the Absence of US Counteraction" (Published 9 February 1948)

1. ORE 69 (dated 9 February 1948) was coordinated with difficulty (See Enc. A) and received unqualified agreement from no Agency because it was built upon an assumption, and no Agency would accept the validity of the assumption. Inasmuch as (a) ORE had no choice in the matter of the assumption, it having been specified by the NSC, and (b) the assumption was a necessary premise in any study which hoped to arrive at the facts wanted by the Security Council, the complaints and dissents were futile and irrelevant.
2. The Army concurrence was on the "military aspects of the paper only. No comment on the political aspects of the paper is submitted." The Air Force approved only, "those portions of paragraphs 3 and 4 which refer to air capabilities." Air Force was not, however, "in complete accord with the over-all consideration of political, economic, and psychological repercussions attendant (sic) upon eventuation of the situation specified. Since CIA is unable to prejudge the US reactions, this estimate is stated to be produced on the single hypothesis that the status quo will continue in this regard. This, obviously, is but one of many possible reactions." Navy stated in its dissent: "ONI does not consider it feasible to compound the lack of realism of the assumption (see p. 2, par. 2) with a detailed forecast of events to happen over a wide portion of the earth." The State Department, after a long period of indecision, declined to concur or dissent; undertaking instead to "disassociate" itself from the paper. The reason for State's

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"disassociation" was given as follows: "...the assumption that the United States would take no specific counteraction in the event that the 'Markos Government' gained control of Greece furnishes, if unqualified, no feasible basis for a sound analysis of the consequences of such control."

It is again emphasized that this example of "problem fighting" arose in connection with a paper on which CIA was obliged to use the assumption presumably because the NSC wished to know what would happen "in absence of US Counteraction" not what would happen in the presence of it. The Agencies were aware of this. Actually, their criticism was directed at the NSC.

3. With respect to this paper, attention is also called to certain specific items in the Navy dissent: (a) "The conclusions are not examined with reference to time giving the impression that these events are inevitable and will occur forthwith." [Since the paper is totally hypothetical (if a Markos Government should be established; if the US should employ no counteraction--the one unlikely; the other virtually unthinkable) an intelligent reader could hardly suppose that the utterly hypothetical events which would probably occur if the hypotheses became actualities were set forth as certainties.] (b) "It is doubted that the psychological and political repercussions would be so disastrous as to bring on international panic." [The paper does not say "would"; it says "could" which is quite a different thing.] "Iran and Kurdish area of Iraq could possibly fall under Soviet domination but not necessarily as a result of Communist control in Greece." This statement

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is undeniable, but it is hopelessly irrelevant because ORE 69 is not discussing the fate of these countries in general but only what would happen to them under the assumed circumstances.

It is further pointed out that the above comments, even though they had been relevant, would have been superfluous in view of the fact that ONI, having rejected the assumption, had simultaneously rejected any conclusions to be drawn from it.

4. Enc. A contains a chronology on coordination of ORE 69.

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Enclosure A to Case # 2

ORE 59: "Possible Consequences of Communist Control of Greece in the
Absence of US Counteraction"

National Security Council Staff (NSCS) Directive received	19 January 1948
with deadline of 2 February for an uncoordinated paper.	
Global Survey Group draft (coordinated within ORE) received	27
by Estimates Group and returned with comment.	
Uncoordinated paper to NSCS.	28
Paper sent to State, Army, Navy, and Air Force for coordina-	28
tion with deadline set for 2 February.	
Draft to OCD.	29
Request received by ONI for one day postponement of dead-	2 February 1948
line.	
Air Force concurs with air aspects of paper and submits	3
comments on other parts of paper.	
Army concurs in military aspects of paper only. No comment	3
on the political aspects of paper submitted.	
Navy dissent received	3
Revised draft sent to State	3
Coordination paper to NSCS.	3
Report to Reproduction.	4
Galley proofs received by Estimates Group and returned	5
to Reproduction.	
State dissent received.	5
Page proof read at Reproduction by Estimates Group.	6

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Final report proof received and returned.

9

Report disseminated.

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- 9 -

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CASE # 3

ORE 38-48: "Possible Developments from the Palestine Truce"
(Published 27 July 1948)

1. ONI seriously obstructed coordination of ORE 38-48. At a conference held to discuss the paper the ONI representative concurred. Later ORE was informed that the Navy Department dissented as it would not accept an assumption in Enclosure C which stated "the ultimate objective of Soviet policy vis-a-vis the Middle East is the assumption of the dominant role in the area." (italics ours) Their contention was that the "ultimate objective" of the USSR was the domination of the world, an assumption with which ORE agreed but which had nothing to do with the paper. After several attempts had been made to point out to the Navy that this was a paper on the Middle East and after a final conference attended by two Navy Department representatives, the ONI dissent was withdrawn.
2. This paper was an extremely rushed job. The Secretary of Defense requested it at 1000, 21 July, and the finished paper, including a map, was in the hands of the Director, CIA, at 1645 the same day.
3. A conference was held on 23 July with all intelligence agencies represented, and concurrence was obtained. The Navy Department objections were telephoned to ORE on 26 July and straightened out that day. Meanwhile the paper had been at the printer's and was published 27 July.

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CASE # 4

SR-13: "Arab States"(In preparation)

1. SR-13 will probably be published on or about 1 October but could as well have come out much sooner had it not been for the delays unnecessarily interposed by OIR. The fundamental reason, furthermore, for most of the delay arose from utter refusal on the part of State analysts to understand what a Situation Report is.
2. Between 16 May when SR-13 was sent out, and 11 August when final concurrences were in, ONE was involved in five separate conferences with OIR. The underlying cause of such extensive negotiation was the insistence of State analysts that a Situation Report as such, neither could be nor ought to be written. It was pointed out in vain that ONE is committed to writing Situation Reports in a predetermined form and that objection to the form as such is hardly an agency responsibility in coordination. It was nevertheless persistently the basis of OIR's criticisms that intelligence ought not to be written in the SR form--for example, that SR-13 attempted to cover the history of Egypt in five paragraphs and that it is impossible to cover the history of Egypt in five paragraphs. OIR analysts still held to such a view when it was pointed out that although the history of Egypt certainly cannot be covered in such a short space, the limited historical background needed for the purposes of a Situation Report can be so compressed.

- 11 -

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Futile argument along these general lines continued from 9 June to 5 July when the Chief, DPM/OIR, overruled his analysts on the point. One week thereafter, State concurrence was received.

- 12 -

SECRET

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CASE # 5

SR-30 (In preparation)

1. The coordination of SR-30 (began 21 July 1949 and still unfinished as of this writing, 30 September 1949) has been delayed primarily through failure of OIR personnel to understand, or at least to work within, the rules and principles governing inter-agency coordination of intelligence. Though even "normal" coordination renders it impossible to publish a situation report which is even reasonably up to date, an extra two months' delay can render a report virtually useless. Furthermore, the time lag usually compels further revision which means further delay. The viciousness of the circle is obvious.
2. The following chronology demonstrates the delays that occurred after the final draft was circulated for comment, and indicates the reasons for the delay (See especially events recorded for 7 September).
- 7/21/49 - Draft sent to IAC agencies for comments -- deadline 8 August.
- 7/28 - State asked for extension to August 18 (analyst on leave).
Granted.
- 8/10 - ONI and Air comments received.
- 8/11 - Army comments received.
- 8/23 - Additional Navy comments received.
- 8/23 - State's comments on Economic Section received.
- 8/24 - State asked for extension to 31 August on remainder.
- 9/7 - Comments received from State on Summary and part of Chapter I.
- These comments entailed about 30 pp. of comment on about 35 pp.

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of text, clear evidence in itself that OIR, rather than furnishing comments as outlined in DCI 3/2, was endeavoring to rewrite the paper according to its own tastes. Many of the comments were captious; or purely editorial.

The same day, ORE received a call from OIR (Coordinator's Office) explaining that the analysts working on SR-30 declined to work further on the paper, although their comments on Chapter I were not complete and nothing had been done on Chapter III. Their reason seemed to lie in the theory that they should not be called upon to put out so much time on a report which they did not like; but it is quite evident that if they had performed the function they were called upon to perform under DCI 3/2, no such incursion on their time would have been necessary.

- 9/12 - CIA called State to ascertain what progress, if any, was being made on remainder of Chapter I (Political) and Chapter III (Foreign Affairs). OIR (Coordinator's Office) agreed to try to obtain comments on these.
- 9/20 - State's comments still not complete and ORE work on SR-30 being delayed on this account.
- 9/22 - CIA called State again. OIR Coordinator advised that analysts had strict orders to expedite completion of comments.
- 9/26 - OIR called to advise that comments were ready (seven weeks late).
- 9/27 - Written comments received (15 pages).

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This Situation Report will be submitted to the IAC Agencies for formal concurrence or dissent upon the completion of revisions resulting from Agency comments.

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CASE # 6

SR-31 [] (In preparation)

1. The principal points brought out in coordination of SR-31 [] were:

a. Dissents on very minor points were offered by State, not because the validity of the intelligence was challenged, but merely because publication of the facts was considered objectionable on grounds of policy.

b. Because ORE could not force compliance with coordination requests, a potential situation was demonstrated in which coordination could become impossible.

2. On 26 July 1949 an inter-agency coordination meeting was held on SR-31 (which had already been circulated in draft for comment) for the purpose of considering a number of objections raised by OIR. The other agencies had already concurred. At the end of the meeting, all representatives, including those of State, were in apparent agreement with the corrected paper, which was duly circulated on 24 August 1949 with a memorandum asking for "concurrence or substantial dissent." On 12 September 1949, seven weeks after the coordination meeting, and three days after the deadline set for final concurrence or dissent, ORE received a telephone call from State saying that the OIR analyst (the same who had attended the coordination meeting) had some more points to "iron out" with CIA. These points proved to be a scattering of very minor suggestions, and a request for two deletions. State expressed itself as determined to

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dissent unless the deletions were made.

The reason for State's adamant stand on the deletions was evidently attributable to the State Policy Desk which apparently did not dispute the points to be deleted but feared the consequences of disseminating them to its own personnel whose security apparently could not be trusted. (Since the deletions in no way changed the purport of the estimate, CIA in this case accepted them.)

3. Aside from the questionable practice outlined above, it should be pointed out that under the terms of DCI 3/1 coordination may easily become a sort of unending farce if further comments are offered after assumed final agreement has been reached. If, as happened in the case of SR-31 and has happened in the case of other papers, one or more agencies request changes after general agreement has been reached, CIA is faced with the alternatives of refusing to accept them or of circulating the paper once more in order to assure itself that the new changes will be acceptable to the parties not aware of them. Inasmuch as a re-circulation of this sort will almost certainly induce one or more previously satisfied agencies to recant and suggest further changes which, if accepted, will have to be recirculated; and because the passage of time will probably require modification of some portions of the report, it can be seen that the whole process, in theory at least, can end in utter futility.

- 17 -

SECRET

CASE # 7

ORE 83-49: "Current Situation [redacted] (In preparation)

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1. This very minor point is offered only because it illustrates an approach to intelligence which ORE has found typical of OIR in general, whose effect varies from mild annoyance and waste of time, as demonstrated below, to considerable delays and serious wastes of man hours in other instances.

2. At a meeting on 28 September 1949, ORE 83-49 was discussed by representatives of all agencies. The paper stated, "The standard of living thus maintained [redacted] is above that which [redacted] economic potential...can support." This was the opinion of CIA, the military agencies, and the US Minister [redacted] An unqualified statement even on an obvious fact was, however, too strong for the OIR man who thought it dangerous and unscholarly to make such an assertion. "Is" in the above sentence was therefore changed to "appears to be." Examples of this kind could be added at great length.

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CASE #8

IM-219 (Revised) "Soviet Intentions in Austria" (Dated 22 September 1949)

1. The coordination of IM-219 was carried on under the pressure of an extremely short deadline requiring the complete cooperation of all of the IAC agencies. The tactics of the Air Force, complicated apparently by its own internal machinery, made it difficult to deliver a coordinated paper within the time required and without a resort to the application of paragraph 3 f of DCI 3/1 which permits the omission of overdue agency comments where a definite deadline must be met. Only the persistent effort and pressure of ORE in obtaining Air comments prevented the exclusion of Air Force comments and the delivery of the paper in the time required. The many minor details enumerated below illustrate the practical difficulties encountered in coordination resulting from unforeshadowed dissents and the slow motion of the Air Force in making and delivering final decisions.

2. At the request of the National Security Council an Intelligence Memorandum concerning Soviet intentions in Austria was delivered on 16 September 1949. Late in the afternoon of 20 September, an urgent request was received via the Chief, ICAPS, for a fully coordinated version of the IM, to be delivered on Monday, 26 September, in other words, within three working days. This situation was immediately explained to the IAC agencies which agreed to send representatives for discussion of the paper on 22 September and to submit final concurrence or dissent by 1200 on 23 September. At the end of the meeting all representatives expressed

- 19 -

SECRET

SECRET

their agreement with the paper as very mildly changed, and had no further comments to make. The ORE chairman of the meeting, realizing the problems that last-minute reversals on a paper so urgent as this would entail, made it a special point to assure himself that no representative had any intention of dissenting or of offering last-minute comments.

On 23 September at 0940 ORE received a telephone call from the Air Force requesting that two changes be made which had not been suggested at the coordination meeting. Neither of these changes had been anticipated by the Air Force representative but were proposed when the paper was reviewed by his superiors. One of these involved changing the words "probably calculates" to "may calculate"; while the other called for deletion of the words "and would involve an undesired risk of war" in a sentence reading: "The USSR probably calculates that Soviet-Satellite supported intrusions on Austrian sovereignty would be countered by strong Western action and would involve an undesired risk of war." ORE declined to accept these changes, first because substitution of "may" for "probably" made no difference whatever, while the only effect of the second change would have been to cause the reader to gather the deleted idea through inference. Furthermore, had the changes been accepted, the result would have been further conferences with State, Navy, and Army which were preparing concurrences on IM-219 as revised and agreed upon the previous day. Air Force, at this point, announced that it would dissent.

- 20 -

SECRET

SECRET

It was pointed out that time was growing short and that ORE must have the Air Force dissent very soon in order to use it. There followed a number of telephone calls in which ORE endeavored to discover when the dissent would be delivered in order that the mechanical processes of preparing the paper might proceed. ORE was put off in each case. One reason given, for example, was that nothing could be done without the approval of a certain Colonel and that he was tied up in an "important meeting." It seemed at the time that the meeting must be extremely important to take precedence over the demands of the National Security Council. At 1515 Air called to say that the responsible officers had finally given up the dissent and would concur with comment.

At about 1715, the Acting Chief of G/SI received a call from Air saying that the concurrence was about to be delivered; he agreed to wait and receive it. The "concurrence with comment," however, read: "concur, subject to the following comments." When informed on Monday morning that conditional concurrences are unacceptable under the terms of DCI '2, Air Force explained that it did not intend the concurrence to be conditional. IM-219 (Revised) was then published, carrying an Air Force concurrence.

- 21 -

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CASE #9

IM-202R: "Review of CIA Estimate ORE 60-48: Threats to the Security of the United States" (Published 28 September 1948)
(Dated 9 August 1949)

1. IM-202 was requested by the JIG as a coordinated Intelligence Memorandum which would revise ORE 60-48 ("Threats to the Security of the United States") in accordance with subsequent events. It would seem clear from ORE's experience with IM-202 that no true coordination can exist so long as one set of Agency personnel, in apparent ignorance of attitudes in echelons above them, carry on the negotiations, while another set makes the final decisions.
2. The paper was completed within ORE and was circulated for concurrence in the belief, which seemed reasonable, that general agreement could be easily obtained. ORE learned, however, that the Departments of Army and of the Air Force had objections to the draft. An ORE representative then held a conference with officers on the highest level he could reach in these two departments, at the end of which both appeared to be satisfied with the negotiated paper. The final result in both cases was an official dissent, each on entirely different grounds and neither reflecting any points of view foreshadowed in the above-mentioned conference.

- 22 -

SECRET

SECRET

CASE #10

ORE 69-49 "Relative US Security Interest in the European-Mediterranean Area and the Far East" (Published 12 September 1949)

1. Air Force representatives with whom this paper was discussed seemed to be satisfied with it and are believed to have sent forward a recommendation for concurrence. After a delay of more than three weeks, however, the Air Force turned in an elaborate dissent.
2. This dissent was interesting for several reasons, but chiefly because (a) one of the main points objected to (briefly, that it is strategically essential to control Japan) had been even more clearly stated in ORE 17-49 in which the Air Force had concurred; and (b) that the dissent originally submitted was in part not on points made in ORE 69-49, but in ORE 72-49 ("Vulnerability of a Communist Government of China to External and Internal Pressures") which was actually quoted as if the words had come from ORE 69-49 where they were not used or implied.

The attitude of the Air Force seemed to be, both from the terms of the dissent and from ideas brought forth in conversation, not that events occurring since publication of ORE 17-49 had forced a revision of estimates, but that the Air Force had changed its mind about the importance of Japan and the off-shore islands. The references to ORE 72-49 were ultimately removed upon request, apparently not primarily because the Air Force saw any compelling reason against using one report to condemn another but because ORE 72-49 in its original form had been cancelled. Parenthetically, the apparently simple operation of making the changes involved consumed much additional time during which the report was, of course, held up.

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CASE #11

ORE 72-49 "Vulnerability of a Communist Government of China to External and Internal Pressures" (Not published; revision in preparation)

1. ORE 72-49 was prepared with elaborate coordination and collaboration with the IAC agencies. On the day before the deadline set for concurrence or dissent the Chief of B/FE was personally assured that each IAC agency would concur in the report. It is reported that the working levels of both the Navy and the Air Force tried to obtain concurrences from their respective "front offices" but were not successful. Both agencies submitted substantial and basic dissents in spite of the fact that there were no points of issue remaining on the working level.

2. The following chronology illustrates the extent to which the agencies were consulted in the preparation of this paper.

30 June 1949 - Informal IAC meeting held to discuss outline

1 July 1949 - Contributions submitted by Army, Navy, and Air on Sec. V C

8 July 1949 - Round table discussion with IAC

9 July 1949 - O900 submitted paper to G/SI with changes therein discussed on 8 July

11 July 1949 - Paper sent to Policy Planning Staff of Dept of State and IAC agencies

14 July 1949 - IAC conference held - paper again revised

22 July 1949 - Paper forwarded IAC for formal concurrence or dissent by 29 July

5 Aug. 1949 - ONI dissented

4 Aug. 1949 - Air Force dissented

- State concurred

- Army concurred

3. ORE 72-49 was not published in its original form.

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CASE #12

ORE 22-48: "Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action during 1948-49"
(Published 2 April 1948)

1. ORE 22-48 was prepared and agreed to by a joint ad hoc committee on which the Air Force was represented. It was published on 2 April 1948 with a statement that the Air Force had concurred. In a memorandum bearing the same date as that of publication of the estimate, the Director of Air Force Intelligence stated that he did not concur, his reasons having to do chiefly with American inability, with our "Occidental approach," to fathom the curious paradoxes of "Oriental" (Russian) logic. A copy of this Air Force dissent was stapled in "ditto" to the published document.
2. A memorandum fully covering the circumstances underlying the preparation and coordination of ORE 22-48, dated 23 December 1948, was sent to the Director of Central Intelligence. A copy is appended as Enc.A.

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Approved For Release 2004/03/15 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000300030004-1

Enclosure A to Case # 12

23 December 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: CIA Relations with the Air Force on Estimates of Soviet Intentions.

1. My understanding of the origin of the March "war scare" is that General Clay wrote a letter to the Secretary of War in which he stated that although he had no specific evidence to support his position he had a distinct "feeling" that the USSR might resort to military action in the near future. I never saw Gen. Clay's letter.

2. After this letter was discussed in the Department of the Army, as I understand it, General Chamberlain called a meeting of the Directors of the IAC Agencies to discuss the situation. At this meeting, after considerable general discussion, it was decided to appoint an ad hoc working committee representing all the IAC Agencies to make a quick reassessment of Soviet intentions for the next 60 day period and report back to the Directors of the agencies.

3. I was appointed chairman of this ad hoc committee. Within a few days this committee submitted a report to a second meeting of the Directors of the IAC Agencies. The Directors did not accept the full report but decided instead to submit to the President, and to publish as a CIA Special Evaluation, a short three paragraph statement under the title, "Reassessment of Soviet Intentions for the Next 60 Days", dated 16 March 1948.

4. The ad hoc committee continued its studies and subsequently published three additional estimates as follows:

1. "Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948", (ORE 22-48), 2 April 1948.
2. "The Strategic Value to the USSR of the Conquest of Western Europe and the Near East (to Cairo) Prior to 1950" (ORE 58-48), 30 July 1948.
3. "Appendices to ORE 58-48", 27 October 1948. (Nos. 2 and 3 were under the code name Project 50)
5. In September the ad hoc committee was reassembled to review

ORE 22-48, "Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948", and to extend the period under review to the end of 1949. This was published on 16 September 1948 as ORE 22-48 (Addendum).

6. The following procedures were followed in the preparation of the above estimates:

a. The paper submitted to the second meeting of the Directors of the IAC Agencies was based upon a draft which I had submitted for the consideration of the members of the ad hoc committee.

b. In the preparation of ORE 22-48, "The Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948", the representative of each agency on the ad hoc committee submitted a draft. I then prepared a new draft on the basis of the submissions, which, after review and amendments by the committee, was accepted as the final paper.

c. The basic work on ORE 58-48 (Project 50) was prepared by four interdepartmental subcommittees which studied, respectively, the military, economic, political and scientific aspects of the problem. On the basis of these four subcommittee studies, I draft the paper which, after consideration and amendments by the committee, was published as ORE 58-48. The subcommittee reports were subsequently published as Appendices to ORE 58-48.

d. The draft for ORE 22-48 (Addendum) was prepared by Mr. Reitzel of CIA after the ad hoc committee had discussed ORE 22-48 and agreed upon the changes which it considered necessary.

7. As already indicated, these estimates have all been published and distributed to the authorized recipients of CIA studies. You will recall that after ORE 22-48 was in print, General MacDonald, Director of Intelligence, USAF, submitted an elaborate comment, which amounted to a dissent, and, which was attached in dittoed form to the published paper. The Office of Naval Intelligence also made a minor modification in the conclusions. You may recall also that you had authorized publication of this study without resubmission to the Directors of the Intelligence Agencies. ORE 58-48 (Project 50) included, as Enclosure B to the report, an elaborate dissent by the Intelligence Organization of the Department of the Air Force. This dissent represented the opinion of the Director of the Air Force Intelligence Organization and was prepared after the original paper had been agreed to by the Air Force working members and after changes had been incorporated which the Air Force members had anticipated would meet the objections of the Director.

8. To my knowledge, ORE has never seen during this period any Air Force estimate on Soviet intentions except the preliminary draft submitted, along with those of the representatives of the other agencies,

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for the preparation of ORE 22-48. We have certainly never seen any Air Force estimate that could be described as likely to involve this country in war nor did we see any estimate on Soviet intentions to attack Scandinavia as reported by the Alsops. It is quite true, however, that at the time of the preparation of the 60 day estimate for the second meeting of the IAC Directors and of ORE 22-48, the Air Force elements were far more alarmist than any of the others and would probably have preferred that the possibility of Soviet military action be more strongly emphasized.

9. During a number of interviews with representatives of the Hoover and the Dulles-Jackson Committees, I made the following comments with reference to the necessity for an independent, top level agency such as CIA to make intelligence appreciations and estimates for the policy makers of the Government.

a. I stated that it was virtually impossible under present circumstances to get a completely objective intelligence estimate from the Service departments, as they were unable to free themselves from the influences of departmental policy and budgetary interests.

b. As illustrative of this point, I told the committee representatives that in the preparation of ORE 22-48, the G-2 representative had stated that General Chamberlain wanted to have included in the estimate a recommendation for the draft and universal military training, which I emphatically refused to consider. I also told them that the Air Force was far more alarmist than the rest of the committee members and that everyone noted a marked change in their attitude after the 70 Group Air Force had been obtained. I may also have made reference to the fact that it was frequently the tendency of the military departments too readily to translate capabilities into intentions without giving due weight to the wide range of political, economic and psychological considerations that enter into the decision of any nation in resorting to military action.

10. I have very strong convictions concerning the points made in 9 above, which are applicable to the State Department as well as to the military Services, and I would be prepared to restate these views under any circumstances.



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CASE #13

SR-17 [] (Published 30 November 1948)

1. It is believed that this report was held up approximately one month primarily because the Latin American policy desk in State would not allow OIR to concur in valid intelligence for fear that it would be misused by personnel receiving it.
2. On 30 September 1948, the date set for Agency comments on the report, informal State comments were received by ORE on the basis of which several changes were made. At a later conference lasting one hour and a half, a slightly different set of comments was discussed between ORE and OIR. At the end of this conference, it was believed that concurrence would be forthcoming, and in fact it did come on 15 October. It had no sooner been received, however, than a telephone call from OIR informed ORE that the concurrence should be disregarded and that a dissent would follow. On 25 October, an OIR representative discussed the text of the proposed dissent with ORE. Later in the week, another conference was arranged which lasted three hours and a half and resulted in a formal dissent, dated 4 November - more than a month after the original deadline.
3. Some aspects of this dissent were interesting. In its draft, CIA had stated, in effect, that [] lying just beyond the zone of effective US power, could act more independently in matters of foreign policy than those countries lying within this zone, a statement which implied that these countries were not "independent." OIR had evidently consulted the policy desk and had been told to dissent on any statement that implied Latin

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American dependence on US policy. Presumably no one in State was unaware of the truth of the general statement, but State evidently feared the effect on US-Latin American relations if this thesis were publicly circulated in Central American capitals as an official US point of view. Of itself, such a fear would certainly be valid, but CIA can only assume that material classified SECRET will not be divulged. The security problem involved obviously bears no relation to the intelligence produced.

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CASE # 14

ORE 76-49: "Survival Potential of Non-Communist Regimes in China"
(In preparation)

1. The central point in this case concerns the apparent failure of Air to understand the nature of the coordination process as it is carried out at present. A draft of this paper was sent to the several agencies for comment on 7 September. It was clearly stated in the covering memorandum that a revised paper would be later circulated for formal concurrence or dissent only. It was apparent at the meetings held on 15, 16, and 20 September, however, that all those concerned in Air had not yet completely reviewed the paper and prepared their comments on it. The Air representative appeared himself somewhat less than familiar with the paper and with the official Air attitude toward it, and specifically requested an intermediate "edition" of the paper, to be circulated for further comment as a result of the meeting, before formal concurrence or dissent was requested. It was not feasible, as he indicated, given the present organization of Air Intelligence, for all those concerned to comment upon the draft in the time allowed. It was evident also that he did not have the necessary powers with respect to this paper to represent adequately an official Air Force position on it.
2. The character of Air disagreement with the paper, while productive of a number of changes which no doubt improved the paper, was indefensible in an intelligence organization. The Air position appeared to be that the paper was too pessimistic on the survival potential of the several regimes discussed. The suggestion was seriously advanced by the

Air representative, that, since error in estimates was inevitable, such error should be consciously slanted in an optimistic direction.

3. On the final day of the discussion of this paper, the State representative remarked that the paper as it stood had been "cleared with the policy desk." The implication here was obvious: so long as the appropriate policy desk had approved the paper, OIR was satisfied, and would concur. On the other hand, had there been disapproval by the policy desk, it was equally clear that the attitude of OIR would have been substantially different.

4. At this writing (28 September) ORE 76-49 is being prepared for final, formal coordination.

CASE # 15

ORE 45-49: "Probable Developments in China" (Published 16 June 1949)

1. The need for ORE 45-49 arose out of an IAC meeting of 20 May 1949 at which the Director of Central Intelligence offered to have a paper prepared on the subject. The resultant request from the DCI was naturally taken as urgent by ORE which planned on completion of the paper by about 8 June which was theoretically quite feasible. Some of the reasons why 17 June was the actual dissemination date, may be gathered from Encs. A and B. There was every reason to believe that after the meeting of 2 June all agency experts were in agreement on the paper. The abrupt change in the State attitude dating from about 10 June is believed to have taken place after consultation with the State policy desk.
2. Enc. A sets forth some of the chronological steps by which ORE 45-49 was coordinated; Enc. B, an extremely informal account of efforts between 10 and 14 June to discover what State was planning to do and when ORE might have a formal statement, is included verbatim because it is believed to show certain practical difficulties of coordination and possibly to reflect an effort on the part of the State policy desk through OIR, either to suppress or to revise the paper.

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Enclosure A to Case # 15 CHRONOLOGY

ORE 45-49: "Probable Developments in China"

- 31 May 1949 - Draft sent to IAC Agencies
- 2 June 1949 - Meeting with IAC Representatives
- 7 June 1949 - Revised draft sent to IAC Agencies with deadline 1200, 10 June
- 10 June 1949 - Oral concurrence without comment from Army
- 13 June 1949 - Concurrence without comment from Air
- 13 June 1949 - Concurrence without comment from ONI
- 13 June 1949 - Oral concurrence with comment from State; later changed to dissent
- 14 June 1949 - Written concurrence from Army
- 14 June 1949 - Dissent received from State
- 17 June 1949 - Disseminated

- 34 -

SECRET

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Enclosure B to Case # 15

ORE 45-49: "Probable Developments in China"

Friday, 10 June
(Approx. times)

1030 Mrs. Bryson, secretary to Mr. Dunn, Chief, Intelligence Coordinating Staff, OIR, called stating that comments on ORE 45-49 had come in and that they appeared to constitute the basis for a dissent.

I inquired if Mr. Dunn was back from Flushing Meadows (UN) and was told Yes, but that he had just returned and was not yet back in the "harness." I then asked for Mr. Barnard, Mr. Dunn's assistant, and was told he would be out all day.

1100 Called Col. Booth, Office of Special Assistant to Sec. State for Research and Intelligence, but unable to reach him.

1215 Mrs. Bryson called on another matter and we in turn asked about progress of preparation of comment. She was unable to say whether or not we could expect a concurrence or dissent.

1400 Called Col Booth and asked him to check into matter. He told me he had been away for a few days and wasn't up on this project but would check. He suggested I call Dunn's office, and that possibly CIA Branch should contact OIR analyst.

1630 Called Mr. Dunn's office and was told by Mrs. Bryson that Mr. Huntsberger, Acting Chief, DRF, was on active duty

- 35 -

SECRET

with Navy, but would have to look over comments prior to their being sent up to Col. Booth's office. Presumably this would be done over the week-end.

1640 Tried to reach Huntsberger at Navy (OP-35) but unable to.

Monday, 13 June.

0930 Called Huntsberger. He stated that over week-end OIR had decided to concur provided we made certain changes in accordance with comment. If not, he wanted us to publish State comment.

1100 Called Mr. Dunn. Discussed pros and cons of publishing a comment that was not a dissent. He indicated that State did not want to dissent, but unless we published their comment, State would be forced to.

1415 Mr. Dunn called and stated little headway had been made. I informed him we would go to press without State comment if it were not received by end of day.

1615 Mr. Dunn called and gave us State dissent over the telephone, but Col. Booth had to confirm.

1640 Col Booth called and vetoed Mr. Dunn's wording. Stated a written statement would be forthcoming the following morning.

Tuesday, 14 June

1030 State written dissent received. Almost identical with what Mr. Dunn had given us over the telephone.

CASE # 16

ORE 17: "

(Published 31 May 1947)

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1. This case offers a prime example of the subordination of technical substantive concurrence in a paper to other considerations outside the scope of intelligence coordination. The following points are of the greatest significance:

a. There was inexcusable delay in OIR's formal coordination of this paper. Although IFI/OIR comment on the initial draft was prompt and indicated general concurrence (Enc.A, para. 4), formal dissent was not received until eight weeks after the circulation of a draft revised to take IFI/OIR comments into account.

b. Although the qualified personnel in IFI/OIR had indicated substantive concurrence, and although their comments were taken into account in the draft prepared for formal concurrence, the ultimate OIR position was one of dissent, a reversal which took place after intent to concur had been informally communicated to ORE (Enc.A, para. 5). Meetings which reviewed the revised OIR dissent gave hope for agreement and concurrence, but the qualified personnel who participated in these meetings found their position repeatedly reversed (Enc.A, para. 9).

c. The initial dissent filed by OIR was "totally unacceptable for publication" (Enc.A, para. 6) being couched in offensive tone and devoid of constructive criticism and any positive statement of the OIR position.

2. While it can only be surmised, in the absence of positive proof, the coincidence of events supports the inference that the reversal and delay in the coordination of this paper were designed to delay the appearance of ORE 17 until an OIR paper on a similar subject had come out (Enc. A, para. 10).

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Enclosure A for Case # 16

Excerpts from Memo to AD/ORE from Chief, Intelligence Staff, ORE
dated 5 August 1947

Subject:

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2. The project was conceived some seven months ago. Its development was delayed by the very meagerness of relevant data then available in the I.A.B. agencies. Preparation of the initial draft required extensive inquiry in the State Department's Office of Financial and Development Policy, the Treasury Department, and the Department of Commerce. In these circumstances, however, it seemed all the more important that C.I.G. produce a well-founded and broadly based intelligence estimate on the subject.

3. The earliest draft prepared by the Economics Group is dated 25 February. This draft constituted the basis of further discussion leading to a revised draft dated 10 April.

4. In view of the difficulties which subsequently developed with OIR, it should be recorded that the 10 April draft was submitted to the Chief, IFI (the economics division of OIR) for comment, and that on 16 April he submitted in writing his own comments and those of DRE (the cognizant regional division of OIR). Those comments, by the appropriate spokesmen for OIR in working-level coordination, indicated general concurrence in the ORE draft and in no way foreshadowed the subsequent

- 39 -

SECRET

dissent by SA-E. A further revision in the light of these and other comments resulted in a draft dated 30 April.

5. The 30 April draft was submitted to the Intelligence Staff, which by 5 May returned it to the Economics Group for revision in certain particulars. This revision was completed by 20 May, when the final version was submitted to the designated representatives of the I.A.B. agencies for final, formal coordination in accordance with C.I.G Administrative Order No. 32. By 27 May ONI, G-2, and A-2 had concurred. Being advised by telephone that OIR also concurred, subject to a few minor suggestions, the Projects Division recorded the project as completed on 31 May and gave the text that date.

6. On 4 June, while in OIR on other business, I learned accidentally that OIR was actually advising SA-E to dissent. Because of the involved procedure for State Department action in such cases the substance of the dissent was not available to us until 10 June. The dissent was totally unacceptable for publication, being replete with misrepresentations of our estimate (quotation out of context, misquotation, etc.), offensively patronizing in tone, and generally devoid of constructive criticism or of any positive statement of the OIR position.

7. I immediately requested a conference with OIR in order to eliminate the dissent through discussion and agreement or at least to obtain a clearer and more informative statement of it, fit for publication. OIR, however, would not confer with us until 23 June. Meanwhile, on 20 June,

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the text, dated 31 May, was sent to Reproduction with a view to expediting its eventual publication, considering the time already lost.

8. At our conference with OIR on 23 June we were handed a completely revised dissent, much less offensive than the original, but equally unclear as a definition of the issue or as an affirmative statement of the OIR position. After discussion OIR requested time to revise the dissent again in consultation with our Economics Group, promising prompt submission of a final version.

9. From 23 June onward the Economics Group met frequently with representatives of OIR. These meetings gave promise of eliminating the SA-E dissent altogether, for in direct discussion the technical specialists of ORE and OIR were able to reach tentative or virtual agreement. The OIR representatives, however, were never able to obtain the approval of OIR for any formula of agreement proposed, and so were continually obliged to reopen the discussions on some new tack. This constant shifting of ground prevented any constructive accomplishment. After three weeks it was apparent that further discussion was futile. The final version of SA-E dissent, received on 14 July, was substantially identical with that of 23 June.

10. By hindsight it appears that there never was, after 2 June, any real prospect of obtaining OIR concurrence in ORE 17. It is pertinent to inquire why OIR reversed its position between 31 May and 4 June, and why it subsequently stalled off for seven weeks the publication of ORE 17. No provable answers can be given to those questions, but the following considerations provide a basis of fair inference:

SECRET

a. Our earlier, working-level coordination had been with economists of OIR -- the Chief of IFI and a DRE economist. They were, apparently, disposed to concur as late as 31 May. But the author of the dissent was the Chief of the [REDACTED] who had been away, returning on or about 2 June. He is not himself an economist; it is evident in his dissent that his concern is with political rather than economic aspects of the subject.

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b. The delay from 4 June to 23 June is attributable to the fact that during that period OIR was working under pressure to produce its own estimate for incorporation in the SWNCC Country Study on the

[REDACTED] It is fair to say, I believe that that paper, as first drafted, gives evidence of being not so much an objective intelligence estimate as an effort to "sell" a predetermined line of policy. This same tendency is evident in the several versions of the SA-E dissent from ORE 17.

c. From 23 June onward an OIR concurrence in ORE 17 would have been inconsistent with the position to which OIR had committed itself in the SWNCC Country Study. Thus OIR was obliged, for political reasons, to disallow every tentative agreement with us reached by its own technical experts in substantive discussion. This does not explain, however, why OIR did not produce promptly a clearcut dissent, so that the publication of ORE 17 could proceed. The evident state of disagreement within OIR, and the consequent difficulty of drafting such a dissent, may be a sufficient explanation. I feel justified in suspecting,

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however, a more or less premeditated effort to protect the estimate referred to in h above by preventing the publication of ORE 17 until SWNCC had acted on its

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11. The data on which the OIR position was based were revealed to us when the SWNCC Country Study was referred to us for comment. The Economics Group, in oral comment before a SWNCC subcommittee, was then able to point out elementary errors in OIR's calculations, which the OIR representatives present were obliged to acknowledge. The subcommittee undertook to revise the paper in the light of our comment. Thus, although OIR did delay the publication of ORE 17 for seven weeks, it did not thereby succeed in imposing its unilateral view on SWNCC, if such was its purpose.

- 43 -

SECRET

SECRET

CASE #17

Summary of Coordination of Earliest ORE Productions

1. Appended are excerpts from a report of the first twenty ORE publications on which formal coordination was attempted. It can be seen from the date of the report (4 August 1947) that the events recorded occurred before ORE and the IAC agencies had any but the most general directions as to what constituted coordination or exactly how it was to be accomplished. A review of the record, however, will show that, in general, much the same difficulties were encountered with the agencies as have been experienced since December 1947 when the first of the coordination directives was issued. It could even be said, still in general, that results in the pre-directive period were on the whole better than those obtained later. For example, SR-1 (Turkey) was coordinated in eight days; SR's 2 and 3 (Korea and Denmark) in twelve apiece. In more recent months no such speedy coordination has been possible.

It is thought that this contrast may serve as an indication that the agencies have tended to observe regulations only when they have found it expedient to do so.

-- 44 --

SECRET

Enclosure A to Case # 17

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Excerpts from Memorandum entitled

TIME REQUIRED FOR FINAL COORDINATION WITH
DEPARTMENTAL AGENCIES UNDER EXISTING PROCEDURE

Dated 14 August 1947

Since the publication of C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 32, twenty C.I.G. reports and estimates have been submitted to the process of final, formal coordination prescribed therein. The procedure followed in each case and the time required to complete it are set forth below. Experience shows that, even with thorough prior coordination on the working level, two weeks are normally required to obtain final action on the formal level. The range of our experience in that respect has been from 5 days in the first and best case to 55 days in the worst case, the average being 17 days and the median 14 days.

The differences in the performance of the several agencies in this respect are indicated in the following tabular statement:

	<u>SA-E</u>	<u>G-2</u>	<u>O.N.I.</u>	<u>A-2</u>
Median	11 days	8 days	8 days	7 days
Average	14 "	11 "	9 "	8 "
Extreme	55 "	27 "	17 "	14 "

1. O.R.E. 7, Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia. This estimate had been thoroughly coordinated on the working level prior to its submission to the departmental representatives on 27 November, on 2 December they met with the Intelligence Staff to act on it, concurring without

- 45 -

SECRET

SECRET

change. Elapsed time in final, formal coordination (without substantive effect): 5 days.

At this meeting the departmental representatives took the position that any substantive coordination must be effected on the working level and that final clearance through them should be accomplished by an exchange of memoranda.

3. O.R.E. 1/1, Revised Soviet Tactics in International Affairs.

Shortage of manpower in the EE/USSR Branch prevented specific coordination of this text on the working level prior to its submission.

19 Dec. - Submitted to departmental representatives.

2 Jan. - Concurred in by all except SA-E.

The SA-E representative submitted, as "substantial dissent," a seven-page memorandum of comment to him from DRE. ORE was able to meet most of these comments by slightly rephrasing its text without substantial change. Others it could not accept, and with respect to them it requested that the representative phrase SA-E's dissent for publication, as the memorandum did not do. He was disposed to insist that ORE must change its text with respect to each point of comment, or else phrase the dissent itself, being willing to accept ORE's working in either case. Ultimately ORE had to insist upon either a concurrence or an explicit dissent by him.

6 Jan. - SA-E representative concurred in text as modified by ORE (without substantial change).

Elapsed time: 18 days.

- 46 -

SECRET

SECRET

4. O.R.E. 10, Forthcoming Elections in This estimate was based on written estimates obtained from OIR (DRA) and G-2. In view of that fact, and of the fact that the election was only 12 days away, ORE had resort to the escape clause in paragraph 4, C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 32.

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24 Dec. - Submitted to departmental representatives and simultaneously sent to press.

27 Dec. - Concurred in by all except SA-E.

2 Jan. - "Substantial dissent" by SA-E.

5 Jan. - Election

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The SA-E dissent was substantial only insofar as it contradicted the advice from OIR (DRA) on which the C.I.G. estimates had been based. ORE was unwilling to publish it as ORE 10/1 inasmuch as

a. Reproduction could not be completed before the election, after which the entire subject would be without significance.

b. State would thereby be permitted to repudiate its own share of responsibility for the conclusions reached in ORE 10.

c. State's comment was essentially negative rather than constructive. It condemned the C.I.G. estimate without stating any different estimate.

The solution agreed upon was to collaborate on a new estimate of the post-election situation. As yet, however, it has proved impossible to obtain adequate information on which to base such an estimate.

- 47 -

SECRET

SECRET

6. O.R.E. 13/1, The Situation in Austria. In view of the experience recited in paragraphs 2-5 above, of oral instructions not to call on the Departments for research support, of oral instructions to resort to paragraph 4 of C.I.G. Administrative Order No. 32 rather than accept undue delay in the publication of estimates, and of the imminence of the Moscow Conference, this estimate was sent to press without prior coordination.

20 Feb. - Submitted to departmental representatives and simultaneously sent to press.

28 Feb. - Concurred in by all except SA-E.

3 Mar. - "Substantial dissent" by SA-E.

The SA-E dissent was, essentially, not a contradiction of the substance of the report, but a complaint that it was not sufficiently broad in scope and consequently misleading. The dissent was intemperate in tone, and negative rather than constructive, in that it condemned the C.I.G. estimate without giving OIR's opposing estimate of the situation. After direct consultation, OIR waved its demand for publication of the dissent and ORE agreed to collaborate in the preparation of a report of the scope desired by OIR. It is now agreed that the forthcoming Situation Report on Austria will satisfy this commitment.

14. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This estimate has been thoroughly coordinated on the working level.

- 48 -

SECRET

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SECRET

- 20 May -- Submitted to departmental representatives.
- 28 May -- Concurrences received from ONI, G-2, A-2.
- 10 June-- SA-E dissent received.
- 23 June-- Direct conference with OIR on dissent, at which a revised version thereof was received. (This was the earliest date at which OIR would confer.) After discussion, OIR requested time in which to revise dissent again.

The SA-E dissent was surprising, inasmuch as we had obtained the comments of IFI and DRE, the cognizant divisions of OIR, in terms which in no sense foreshadowed it. Apparently it was a consequence of personnel changes in OIR and of the fact that OIR had meanwhile submitted to SWNCC an estimate contradictory to the position it had taken in consultation with us. Between 23 June and 14 July the Economic Group endeavored, in frequent conference with the new representative of OIR, to obviate the dissent or at least to obtain its statement in clear and relevant terms. This effort was unduly prolonged by the constantly renewed prospect of early agreement, but the final formulation of SA-E dissent was substantially identical with that of 23 June.

14 July -- Final formulation of SA-E dissent received.

Elapsed time: 55 days.

- 49 -

SECRET